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REVIEW ESSAY

Defending Society From the Abnormal
The Archaeology of Bio-Power
Brad Elliott Stone, Loyola Marymount University

I: Introduction
The publication of the Collège de France lecture courses marks a new phase of
Foucault scholarship. So far there have been four lecture courses published by
Gallimard: “Il faut défendre la société” (1997), Les anormaux (1999),
L’herméneutique du sujet (2001), and Le pouvoir psychiatrique (2003). Of these,
two lecture courses, “Society Must Be Defended”1 and Abnormal,2 have already
been translated into English, with The Hermeneutics of the Subject ready for
publication by the end of this year. These lecture courses are valuable for
Foucault scholarship not only because they supplement the arguments given
by Foucault in his published monographs during the same period (Discipline
and Punish and The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1), but also because there are
topics that, although perhaps mentioned briefly or implicitly in the
monographs, come to the foreground in the lectures in a way that goes
beyond the published texts.
There are probably some Foucauldians who object to the publication of
the lectures. Those who take Foucault’s final wishes seriously consider the
lectures “unpublished” by Foucault, and they should therefore be
“unpublished” today, lest one turn Foucault into an author of an oeuvre. The
editors write in the preface of all of the lecture course books that the lectures
should not be considered “unpublished” because Foucault delivered them in
the form of public lectures and, furthermore, the books are not publications of

1

2

Michel Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975‐
1976, trans. David Macey, English series ed. Arnold I. Davidson (New York: Picador,
2003). Future references to this text will be made as SMD followed by the English
translation page number.
Michel Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974‐1975, trans. Graham
Burchell, English series ed. Arnold I. Davidson (New York: Picador, 2003). Future
references to this text will be made as AB followed by the English translation page
number.
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Foucault’s lecture notes (although the notes were sometimes consulted);
rather, they are transcriptions from audio tapes recorded by students of
Foucault.3 However, contrary to the editors’ intentions, serious Foucauldians
would remind them that Foucault does mention the transcription of public
addresses as part of the oeuvre process:
[D]oes the name of an author designate in the same way a text that he has
published under his name, a text that he has presented under a pseudonym,
another found after his death in the form of an unfinished draft, and another
that is merely a collection of jottings, a notebook? … [I]s it enough to add to
the texts published by the author those that he intended for publication but
which remained unfinished by the fact of his death? … And what status
should be given to letters, notes, reported conversations, transcriptions of what
he said made by those present at the time, in short, to that vast mass of verbal
traces left by an individual at his death, and which speak in an endless
confusion so many different languages (langages)?4

There are many ways to turn works into an oeuvre of a given author. If
“Foucault” is the name of an author‐function, we are warned against making
an oeuvre that corresponds to that function. The Foucauldian oeuvre at the time
of Foucault’s death would look like this: the published manuscripts of
Foucault; the interviews he gave that were published in magazines and
journals; and essays written by Foucault as prefaces, articles, and
interventions. With Foucault’s death, some would argue that if scholars were
to turn Foucault into an oeuvre, these would be the materials that would be the
canon (and nothing more). This is what makes Dits et Écrits acceptable; all of
its entries were previously published by Foucault within his lifetime or
cleared for publication before his death.
However, there are other things that are of interest to professional
academics: transcriptions of what Foucault said (viz., the lecture courses),
pseudonymous writings (e.g., “Michel Foucault” by Maurice Florence), and
texts in draft form that would have been published if Foucault had been able
to finish them (e.g., the final three volumes of The History of Sexuality). These
items serve as wonderful resources for Foucault scholarship, and would
greatly enhance the understanding of Foucault’s works. Some would argue
that these texts should be off limits as primary source material; others
demand their use for the furtherance of scholarship.
Given that I am writing about the lecture courses, it is obvious that I
am in support of their publication and their use in Foucault scholarship. After
all, Foucault scholarship requires that we form an oeuvre that serves as the
object of our investigation. A “hyper‐Foucauldianism” that forbids the
3
4
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Cf. SMD xii, xiv; also cf. AB xiv‐xv.
Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New
York: Pantheon, 1972), 23‐24; emphasis mine.
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formation of an oeuvre would result in the end of Foucault scholarship. If
Foucault scholarship is to continue, we either have to keep talking in circles
about the same texts over and over again (a repetitive commentary), or we
must find new connections, new ideas, and new texts. That is a cold brute fact
of academe. To ward off any allegations of hypocrisy, we Foucauldians can
still hold that the oeuvre is an unstable attempt to form a discursive unity,
although oeuvres are inevitably formed nonetheless. One way to remember
our distrust of oeuvres is to always remind ourselves that there are multiple
“Foucaults” to be studied without feeling the need to form a united
Foucauldian system.
The goal of this essay is to present the main themes of both “Society
Must Be Defended” and Abnormal, which are not only the two translations we
have so far in English, but also the two lecture courses that mark a turning
point in Foucault’s understanding of subjectivity—from a strictly disciplinary
model to a model made up of normalization, governmentality, and the care of
the self. The hope is that the reader will be introduced to the merits of these
texts, and begin to incorporate the ideas therein into future Foucault
scholarship.
The main apparatus in the lectures is the archaeology of sovereignty
and the subsequent epistemic shift to bio‐power. Many readers of Foucault
believe that archaeology is brought to an end with the 1969 publication of The
Archaeology of Knowledge or the 1972 essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.”
This is simply not true. Foucault never gives up the archaeological project. All
of his “genealogical” texts (lecture courses included) describe discontinuities
in enunciative modalities, concepts, domains, statements, and objects.5 Along
with his discussion of the different dispositifs of power, one still finds an
archaeology, albeit implicit in the published monographs, of the knowledge
that emerges along with that power arrangement. Furthermore, those power
arrangements are discontinuous, so that the shift from one dispositif to another
is often complimented by a shift from one epistémè to another. Where the
lecture courses are helpful, I believe, is in the fact that the lecture courses offer
the archaeological analysis that is implicit (or sometimes completely missing)
from the published works.
Foucault mentions archaeology in both lecture courses. In Abnormal, at
the end of the first lecture, although Foucault says aloud that the goal is “to
study … the emergence of the power of normalization,” the manuscript says,
“to do an archaeology of … the emergence of the power of normalization.”6 In
“Society Must Be Defended,” Foucault says that archaeology is “the method
specific to the analysis of local discursivities,” whereas genealogy is “the tact
5
6

Cf. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, Pt. II‐III.
AB 26, including the footnote; emphasis mine.
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which, once it [archaeology] has described these local discursivities, brings
into play the desubjugated knowledges that have been released from them.”7
Here, it seems that genealogy is always a secondary process to be done after
archaeology. In other words, there is no genealogy without prior archaeology.
No power arrangement is analyzable until there is also an analysis of the
knowledges and discourses produced and perpetuated by that power.
Therefore, in this essay, I seek to examine these two lecture courses
archaeologically. Abnormal is an archaeological account of how the concept of
monstrosity is discontinuous from the Classical to the Modern age, and how a
new discourse, medico‐juridical discourse, comes into existence in order to
explain the new concept of monstrosity. This discourse is itself discontinuous
with the juridical and medical discourse of the Classical period, which leads
Foucault to criticize its power over life and death. Since this discourse has the
power over life and death, it becomes bio‐political, aligning itself with
theories of race and sexuality; in short, it becomes one more discourse of
normalization. My discussion of Abnormal makes up the second section of this
essay.
Section three turns to “Society Must Be Defended,” which Foucault states
is the last lecture course on discipline and normalization. In these lectures
Foucault lays out the archaeological elements that account for the Modern
dispositif of power, bio‐power. To do this, Foucault shows the discontinuity in
the concept of history. A new historical discourse, historico‐political
discourse, will emerge as a partial, war‐based account of “nations” (a new
discursive object in its own right). This new discourse directly challenges the
previous “philosophico‐juridical” form of historical discourse, which is best
represented by Hobbes’s Leviathan and Machiavelli’s The Prince. For both
Hobbes and Machiavelli, war is the antithesis of politics; however, as Foucault
will show in “Society Must Be Defended,” politics is nothing more than war
continued in a different way, or said differently, arranged under a different
dispositif. Also, the old historical discourse offers us histories of the sovereign;
the new history will work against the notion of sovereignty. As a result, the
dispositif changes from the power of the sovereign to a war model. This war
model allows for the emergence of bio‐power, as the war that becomes
politics is not the war between one group and another (the Classical notion of
races), but between the dominant subgroup within a country against the
“inferior” subgroup (the Modern notion of races). Therefore, “society must be
defended” from its own inferiorities, the exaggerated result of which is the
State racism of the twentieth century.
In the final section of the essay, I ask the reverse question. Foucault
shows us how knowledge and power work together so as to make the
7
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statement: Il faut défendre la société contre les anormaux. We must, along with
Foucault (for what is the point of archaeology without critique?), ask the
reverse: Faut‐il défendre la société contre les anormaux? Answering this question
negatively opens up a new possibility of subjectivity, truth, and power.
II: Abnormal
According to Foucault, the goal of Abnormal is to analyze “the emergence of
the power of normalization, the way in which it has been formed, the way in
which it has established itself without ever resting on a single institution but
by establishing interactions between different institutions, and the way in
which it has extended sovereignty in our society.”8 What emerges in Abnormal
is a particular discourse, medico‐juridical discourse, also called “expert
psychiatric opinion.” It is a strange mixture of medical and juridical
discourse,9 although it follows neither judicial nor medical discursive
practices. This new discourse gives birth to a new discursive object: the
abnormal. The abnormal represents a monstrosity behind all criminality, a
monstrosity of the lack and/or rejection of bio‐political and/or disciplinary
normative practices.
This new object is discontinuous with the monsters of the previous
epistémès. In the Medieval period, monstrosity was thought of mostly in terms
of “the bestial man,” the person who is half human and half animal, the by‐
product of the crossing of two kingdoms. The Renaissance age puzzled over
Siamese twins, and the Classical epistémè, steeped in its organized tableaux,
was unable to place the hermaphrodite.10 All of these variations or types of
monsters shared the property of being strange “mixtures.” Foucault explains
this idea of the monster in the following way:
the monster is essentially a mixture … of two realms, the animal and the
human: the man with the head of an ox, the man with a bird’s feet—
monsters. It is the blending, the mixture of two species: the pig with a sheep’s
head is a monster. It is the mixture of two individuals: the person who has
two heads and one body or two bodies and one head is a monster. It is the
mixture of two sexes: the person who is both male and female is a monster. It
is a mixture of life and death: the fetus born with a morphology that means it
will not be able to live but that nonetheless survives for some minutes or
days is a monster. Finally, it is a mixture of forms: the person who has neither
arms nor legs, like a snake, is a monster.11
8
9

10

11

AB 26.
As we know from The Order of Things, Foucault is very suspicious about the mixed
nature of things in the Modern epistémè. Cf. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An
Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage, 1970), Ch. 9.
Cf. AB 66.
AB 63.
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Why were monsters a problem? The problem with monsters was that they
defied the categories of understanding, be they civil, scientific, or religious.
This is why Foucault calls the monster in his course summary of the 1974‐1975
year an antiphysis, one that is against nature.12 Monstrosity, Foucault tells us,
“is the kind of natural irregularity that calls law into question and disables
it.”13 To use a well‐established Foucauldian term, monsters are living
transgressions: “the monster is the transgression of natural limits, the
transgression of classifications, of the table, and of the law as table … there is
monstrosity only when the confusion comes up against, overturns, or disturbs
civil, canon, or religious law.”14 The Classical monster was a criminal because
the monstrosity was illegal—it broke the law, and therefore was often
executed under the old punitive methods of sovereign power.
In the Modern period, which begins at the end of the eighteenth
century, the understanding of monsters enters a new stage. In the new
arrangement of knowledge, “[m]onstrosity … is no longer the undue mixture
of what should be separated by nature. It is simply an irregularity, a slight
deviation, but one that makes possible something that really will be a
monstrosity, that is to say, the monstrosity of character.”15 Monsters are no
longer criminals because they violate natural law; criminals are monsters
because they violate the norms of society. In the later part of the eighteenth
century, Foucault tells us, “we see something emerge … the theme of the
monstrous nature of criminality, of a monstrosity that takes effect in the
domain of conduct, of criminality, and not in the domain of nature itself …
the moral monster.”16
The case study that Foucault chooses in order to examine the moral
monster and its role in the emergence of medico‐juridical discourse is the
Henriette Cornier case. In this case, Cornier murders the infant daughter of a
neighbor for what appears to be no reason at all. Since Cornier is not mad in
the Classical sense, she cannot be acquitted. Since she has no direct motive for
the crime, the interest which led her to perform the crime cannot be punished
by Classical punition theory.17 This, Foucault argues, leads to the medico‐
juridical (psychiatric) evaluation of actions, which differs from the merely
medical (is Cornier insane?) or merely juridical (what was Cornier’s motive so
we can punish that motive?) evaluation:
12
13
14
15
16
17
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Cf. AB 328.
AB 64.
AB 63.
AB 73.
AB 74‐75.
Cf. AB 111‐112. The idea that the interest must be punished (and not the crime
directly) is further explained in Discipline and Punish. Cf. Michel Foucault, Discipline
and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1977), 94.
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What do we see when we consider how Henriette Cornier’s life has
unfolded? We see a certain way of being, a certain habitual way of behaving
and a mode of life that exhibits little that is good. She separated from her
husband. She gave herself up to debauchery. She has had two illegitimate
children. She abandoned her children to the public assistance, and so on …
Her debauchery, her illegitimate children, and the abandonment of her
family are all already the preliminaries, the analogy of what will happen
when she well and truly kills a child who lived alongside her … Since the
subject so resembles her act, then the act really is hers and we have the right
to punish the subject when we come to judge the act.18

Her “motiveless crime” actually turns out to be in tandem with the person she
is, a moral monster. Her other abnormalities (debauchery, child
abandonment, illegitimate children, etc.) are the explanation for why Cornier
killed the little girl. Cornier has not merely committed a crime; she is a
criminal monster, and this is just one more event in the chain of her abnormal
agency. Since she is now guilty of something, being an abnormal individual,
she can be punished by law.
With this maneuver, psychiatry becomes differentiated from
psychologico‐medical discourse, which focused on questions of madness. It is
also differentiated from the Classical juridical model, which assigned
punishment based on the material motive of a crime. Medico‐juridical
discourse, Foucault writes, deals with “an irregularity in relation to a norm
and that must be at the same time a pathological dysfunction in relation to the
normal … Between the description of social norms and rules and the medical
analysis of abnormalities, psychiatry becomes essentially the science and
technique of abnormal individuals and abnormal conduct.”19 Therefore “[a]ny
kind of disorder, indiscipline, agitation, disobedience, recalcitrance, lack of
affection, and so forth can now by psychiatrized.”20 As a result, psychiatry
takes center stage in the judicial process.
There are three functions of medico‐juridical discourse within the legal
system. First, psychiatric opinion given by the psychiatrist creates a doubling
effect. The offense is connected to other abnormalities of the accused so that
the defendant herself (what Foucault calls “a psychologico‐ethical double”) is
on trial, not the offense.21 Second, psychiatric opinion creates the
“delinquent,” the person who already resembles the crime committed. This is
useful for crimes that would have previously been labeled as “motiveless.”22
Finally, the psychiatrist takes over the position of the judge, creating the
18
19
20
21
22

AB 124.
AB 163.
AB 161.
Cf. AB 15‐18.
Cf. AB 18‐21.
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“doctor‐judge” double, which brings an end to pure juridical discourse. Since
abnormality is now a medical issue, the goal will no longer be punishing but
treating and curing.23 Under the auspices of medicine, psychiatry gains a
prominent position in the bio‐political dispositif of the Modern epistémè as a
branch of public hygiene, protecting society against the psychological ills of
the abnormal individuals.24 As we will see in the next section of this essay,
eventually it will be said that “society must be defended” from this illness,
and psychiatry will serve as the defender of normalcy.
The last five lectures of Abnormal focus on the issue of sexuality. The
reason why sexuality plays such an important role in the archaeology of
psychiatry is that childhood becomes the breeding ground for abnormality.25
In the nineteenth century, the largest concern about children was
masturbation. As a result, the onanist becomes the paradigm of moral
monstrosity by the end of the nineteenth century. The pathology associated
with masturbation was a medical one, for it was believed that all illnesses
found their roots in masturbation.26 Therefore, the masturbating child begins
the path of abnormality, which might lead not only to medical problems in
her adult life, but also to criminal activities. However, in a unique twist, it is
the parents who have the responsibility to insure that their children refrain
from masturbating. This sets up the Freudian incestuous family structure
(especially in bourgeois families) which serves as the laboratory of psychiatry
well into the twentieth century.27
With the “puerilization” of abnormality, psychiatry becomes able to
evaluate adults as abnormals if they seem to have “arrested development;”
that is, if adults act like children instead of adults. Foucault discusses the
Charles Jouy case as an example of such an evaluation. Charles Jouy is a
migrant worker who has a series of sexual encounters with a little girl. The
girl is sent to a house of correction for her participation in Jouy’s sexual
games. However, there is a question as to how to deal with Jouy . Should he
be psychiatrized? The answer is yes, but for a reason different from the
psychiatrization of Henriette Cornier. Jouy is psychiatrized “by establishing
that he remains extremely close to and almost fused with his own childhood
and the child with whom he had relationships.”28 In short, Jouy is playing
23

24
25

26
27

28
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Cf. AB 21‐23. All three of these functions correspond to the discussion Foucault has at
the beginning of Discipline and Punish. Cf. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 19‐23.
Cf. AB 118‐119.
Cf. AB 242, 299‐305. I am using the term “archaeology of psychiatry” from The History
of Sexuality, Vol. 1, when Foucault states that an archaeology of psychiatry would
amount to a discussion of sexuality. Cf. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol.
1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1978), 130.
Cf. AB 236‐242.
Cf. AB 263‐274.
AB 303.
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“doctor” with the little girl; he has the psychological development of a little
boy; he is a case of arrested development. The difference between Cornier and
Jouy is described by Foucault in terms of the childish traces in one’s actions:
“The alienists essentially said to Henriette Cornier: You were not then what
you later became, and for this reason we cannot convict you. The psychiatrists
say to Charles Jouy: If we cannot convict you, it is because when you were a
child you were already what you are now.”29 Prior to medico‐juridical
discourse, alienists would not try to trace Cornier’s actions back to infantile
instincts. In the Jouy case, it is merely a coincidence that Jouy’s offense was
with a child and could be traced to a childish game; the real difference is that
Jouy is an adult whose criminal actions are explained by an abnormality, a
lack of development.
I will return to Abnormal, especially the first lecture, in the final section
of the essay. It suffices for the moment to have traced the history of
psychiatric discourse and the discursive objects that are created in its wake.
Insofar as this history and these objects are discontinuous, Foucault has
offered an archaeology of the abnormal individual and the discourse that will
make possible a dispositif of power that plays with life and death.
III: “Society Must Be Defended”
“Society Must Be Defended” is probably best thought of as a genealogical text
dealing with the emergence of modern bio‐power through the notion of race.
In this essay, race is viewed as a discursive concept, and therefore placed
within what I believe is the larger archaeological goal of the lectures: the
archaeology of historico‐political discourse. This discourse is discontinuous
with the philosophico‐juridical discourse of Machiavelli and Hobbes and the
Classical notion of history, whose purpose was to legitimize sovereignty
through an “impartial” retelling of past events. Historico‐political discourse,
however, holds that impartiality is impossible, that truths (especially
historical truths) are based on which side of the battle one is on.
Historico‐political discourse is discontinuous with philosophico‐
juridical discourse in three main ways. First, there is a shift in enunciative
modality; that is, the speaker of the discourse changes. Foucault writes that
“the subject who speaks in this discourse [historico‐political discourse] …
cannot, and is in fact not trying to, occupy the position … of a universal,
totalizing, or neutral subject. In the general struggle he is talking about, the
person who is speaking … is inevitably on one side or the other.”30 This
differs from the philosopher, who claims to speak from perfect reflective

29

AB 302‐303.

30

SMD 52.
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equilibrium, from a disinterested view from nowhere. The new discourse
changes that; it approaches truth in an interested way.
Second, historico‐political discourse “inverts the values, the
equilibrium, and the traditional polarities of intelligibility, and which posits,
demands, an explanation from below … in terms of what is most confused,
most obscure, most disorderly and most subject to chance.”31 Since it is an
interested discourse, the new discourse does not seek the pretty or simplest
picture of history. Instead, it puts aside the abstractly universal rational
schemata and offers an ugly, dirty, complicated story. Foucault explains this
new history this way: “So what is the principle that explains history? … a
series of brute facts … a series of accidents … a bundle of psychological and
moral elements … a fundamental and permanent irrationality … which
proclaims the truth.”32 This differs from the philosopher, who stands on the
side of reason and is therefore unwilling (or perhaps unable) to deal with the
hard facts of an unending war.
Third, this new discourse “develops completely within the historical
dimension … It is interested in rediscovering the blood that has dried in the
codes … the battle cries that can be heard beneath the formulas of right … the
dissymmetry of forces that lies beneath the equilibrium of justice.”33 Unlike
the philosopher, who in her own way seeks a kind of “peace” in the
exploration of history, the speaker of historico‐political discourse shows that
war has always been beneath the surface of order and peace. Historico‐
political discourse is a war discourse, which makes it perfect for the analysis
of power in terms of war. The author referenced repeatedly by Foucault is
Boulainvilliers, who formulated a war‐based theory of power and history in
the early eighteenth century.
Prior to the formation of this new discourse, history was a tool of
sovereign power. It performed two functions—one genealogical, the other
memorial. The genealogical function of history was to show that sovereignty
was legitimate. It did so by praising antiquity and its heroes, showing that the
present sovereign is the legitimate heir to that glorious antiquity, and
therefore allows the fame of the past to be incorporated into the present
sovereign. The memorialization function was connected to the genealogical
function insofar as the detailed annals and records of every action and
decision made by the sovereign demonstrated the sovereign’s importance.
This way, the sovereign would survive into posterity.34 In short, “[h]istory
31
32
33

34
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was a ritual that reinforced sovereignty.”35 It was the history of power as told
by power; it was the way that the sovereign justified its claim to power. As
Foucault writes
we can understand the discourse of the historian to be a sort of ceremony,
oral or written, that must in reality produce both a justification of power and
a reinforcement of that power … The point of recounting history, the history
of kings, the mighty sovereigns and their victories … was to use the
continuity of the law to establish a juridical link between those men and
power … Like rituals, coronations, funerals, ceremonies, and legendary
stories, history is an operator of power, an intensifier of power.36

Sovereignty is the subject and the object of the old historical discourse: it is a
history of sovereignty written by the power of the sovereign in order to justify
the sovereignty.
Historico‐political discourse challenges this use of history. It is against
the sovereign; it is “a discourse that cuts off the king’s head, or which at least
does without a sovereign and denounces him.”37 The discourse is taken up by
the oppressed and the non‐sovereign (in France, the aristocracy), and serves
as a counterhistory of sovereignty. Instead of using history to show the
greatness of the sovereign, it would “break up the unity of the sovereign law
that imposes obligations; it also breaks up the continuity of glory … It will be
the discourse of those who have no glory … who now find themselves,
perhaps for a time … in darkness and silence.”38
The result of this counterhistorical discourse is the creation of a new
subject of history, “race,” also called “society,” a discursive object that makes
up the main topic of “Society Must Be Defended.” A society is defined by
Foucault as a “body of individuals governed by a statute, a society made up
of a certain number of individuals, and which has its own manners, customs,
and even its own law . . . a ‘nation.’”39 The concept of a nation will later be
described in terms of a race, but before moving to race, Foucault describes the
importance of the concept of a nation.
In the age of sovereign power and history, words like “nation” and
“race” referred back to the sovereign. A nation was the group of people and
the lands under the power of the sovereign. Hence the sovereign state’s
definition of “nation” was “a great multitude of men … inhabiting a defined
country … circumscribed by frontiers … who have settled inside those

35
36
37
38
39

SMD 69.
SMD 66.
SMD 59.
SMD 70.
SMD 134.
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frontiers [and] must obey the same laws and the same government.”40 In other
words, “[t]he nation in its entirety resides in the person of the king,”41 or, to
use the phrase attributed to Louis XIV, L’Etat, c’est moi. The French race, then,
simply meant “those under the crown of the king of France.”
“Nation” takes on a different meaning in the age of historico‐political
discourse. There arose the possibility of there being multiple “nations” within
a sovereign geopolitical nation. For example, in early nineteenth‐century
France, the nobles considered themselves a nation, and the Third Estate was a
different nation. This is the origin of the concept of nation that “does not stop
at the frontiers but which, on the contrary, is a sort of mass of individuals
who move from one frontier to another, through States, beneath States, and at
an infra‐State level.”42 There can be, for example, one nation in two countries,
or two nations in one country, etc. This changes the understanding of war
radically. War was previously understood in terms of one nation’s (under its
sovereign) being at war with another nation (under a different sovereign).
Only sovereigns went to war. Now, however, there can be wars between two
different nations within the same geopolitical area or under the same
sovereign. History becomes the story of race struggle.
Race war began, Foucault claims, in terms of one nation being against
another, as explained above. However, in the Modern period, race war takes
on a dimension that is more familiar to us in contemporary society. Race
ceases to be a concept tied to sovereignty and geopolitical boundaries; it
becomes the concept of groups within a political entity. This leads to a
different kind of race war than previously conceived:
The discourse of race struggle ( will be recentered and will become the
discourse of power itself. It will become the discourse of a centered,
centralized, and centralizing power. It will become the discourse of a battle
that has to be waged not between races, but by a race that is portrayed as the
one true race, the race that holds power and is entitled to define the norm,
and against those who deviate from that norm, against those who pose a
threat to the biological heritage.43

Contemporary race war is the result of one race (one group, perhaps within
the same country as other races) claiming superiority over all other races,
allowing that dominant race to define what counts as normal. Of course, this
means that the abnormal, which was discussed in the previous section of this
essay, becomes that which goes contrary to the dominant race’s norms. The
purity and perpetuity of the race becomes the goal, and with the advent of
modern biology, racism as we currently understand it is born. The dominant
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race seeks to become the only race in a country. As Foucault describes, there is
“not an armed clash, but an effort, a rivalry, a striving toward the universality
of the State.”44 One result is that the expression “society must be defended”
changes meaning between the sovereign period and the Modern epistémè: “It
is no longer: ‘We have to defend ourselves against society,’ but ‘We have to
defend society against all the biological threats posed by the other race, the
subrace, the counterrace.’”45
And this is how racism ties into bio‐political power. Foucault writes in
the final lecture that race is one of the ways of determining who is forced to
live, and who will be allowed to die.46 In order to force the dominant race to
live, one must get rid of the opposing race that is infecting the dominant race.
Racism serves as a biological war, one whose goal is the dying of the other
races: “The more inferior species die out, the more abnormal individuals are
eliminated, the fewer degenerates there will be in the species as a whole, and
the more I ( can live, the stronger I can be, the more vigorous I will be. I will
be able to proliferate.”47 With this biologism connected to other technologies
of normalization, the war of power continues to rage, in spite of the
appearance of peace (i.e., no war against an opposing country) and order.
Since I want to limit myself to discursive elements in this summary, I
will refrain from saying much about the actual workings of power in these
systems. However, it is important to note that there is a major shift in
dispositifs described in “Society Must Be Defended” between the sovereign
notion of power as repression and the historico‐political understanding of
power in terms of war. By examining the role of war in power and
knowledge, we can begin to think of power in terms other than repression
and take up “Nietzsche’s hypothesis,” that “the basis of the power‐
relationship lies in a warlike clash between forces.”48 These forces can also
take up discursive elements, allowing war to equally serve as an
archaeological model as well.
IV: Conclusions
I conclude with what I take to be Foucault’s concerns about medico‐juridical
and historico‐political discourse. Foucault worries in Abnormal that psychiatry
is itself a kind of monster. If monstrosity is defined in terms of strangeness,
unnaturalness, and mixture, then psychiatry is itself a monstrosity. It is not
quite science, not quite juridical, yet juridico‐scientific. Furthermore, Foucault
argues, psychiatry is “the reactivation of an essentially parental‐puerile,
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parental‐childish discourse ( It is a childish discourse ( a discourse of fear
whose function is to detect danger and to counter it.”49 Psychiatry is childish,
although one of its areas is the puerility of adults. Yet, here is a discourse that
is itself puerile; it is all about dangerous and scary people, “monsters.” The
study of abnormals is based more on fear than science. To show this
childishness, Foucault begins the lecture course with passages from two
psychiatric reports, neither of which are really scientific, for their descriptions
are funny and clearly biased.50 These reports, although funny, are frightening
because “discourses of truth that provoke laughter and have the institutional
power to kill are, after all, discourses that deserve some attention.”51 Given
that the power to punish is contained in such infantile discourses based on
fear, we have reason to be concerned about psychiatric discourse’s role in the
judicial process in an age of bio‐politics.
Similarly, the racist discourse that emerged as a result of historico‐
political discourse, as described by Foucault in “Society Must Be Defended,” has
placed the power to kill into problematic hands. Historico‐political discourse
was developed as a way to escape the model of sovereignty. The result,
however, is the invention of bio‐power, which is actually more intense than
sovereign power. Genocide, colonization, ethnic cleansing, the Holocaust, and
institutional racism are some of the catastrophes that receive justification
through the discourse of race struggle. As with psychiatry, race discourse
infused with the power to kill leaves room for concern. Of course, Foucault is
not suggesting that we return to sovereignty; instead, we must find a new
way of understanding power, a new way of talking about it, a new way of
using it. As Foucault writes, “if we are to struggle against disciplines, or
rather against disciplinary power, in our search for a nondisciplinary power,
we should not be turning to the old right of sovereignty; we should be
looking for a new right that is both antidisciplinary and emancipated from the
principle of sovereignty.”52
As stated at the beginning of this essay, these two lecture courses mark
a turning point in Foucault’s analysis of subjectivity, and lead us on the path
to a new imperative for the next épistème. The new imperative is free from
both sovereignty and normalizing society. The imperative will no longer be
“society must be defended from the abnormal.” Rather, it will be one that is
perhaps the oldest of all, although meant in a different way: “take care of
yourself.”
To those ends, Foucault’s analyses of psychiatry and race discourse
open an opportunity for thought and, perhaps, hope. Archaeology always
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suggests a kind of reversal. If the imperative explored in these lectures is il
faut défendre la société contre les anormaux, the reversal is the following
question: Faut‐il défendre la société? As usual, Foucault does not give us the
answer to the questions raised by his archaeologies. All he gives us is an
axiom: for any discursive formation, if one can show how it came into history,
one can see where it will finally someday unravel.
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